

public antipathy toward Clinton was almost as severe), and whether the media and various campaign events affected the outcome (not much, except perhaps for public backlash against Trump's overwhelmingly negative coverage in the mainstream media). Understandably, given the recentness of events covered, there is little academic scholarship for Fiorina to draw on in supporting these arguments, though they are, of course, grounded in a lifetime of political observation and research. Chapter 11 continues in a similar vein, considering the role that culture, class, and identity played in the 2016 election. Mostly downplaying the importance of race, gender, and ethnicity (and taking a swipe at the "rising American electorate" thesis along the way), the author instead emphasizes white working-class resentment against the corruption and impunity of economic elites and the condescension of cultural ones.

Chapter 12 concludes with Fiorina's thoughts on the likely trajectory of the Trump administration. Though hardly a Trump fan, he strikes a less alarmist tone than many commentators, academic and otherwise. The nation has been through worse and survived, he reminds us, and he reiterates that Trump's victory does not signal the moral bankruptcy of the American people. "Elites are the problem," Fiorina concludes, not ordinary Americans (p. 218).

In keeping with its broad intended audience, the book seems primarily concerned with engaging with the arguments of popular commentators such as Thomas Frank, Matt Bai, and Peggy Noonan rather than of fellow academics. The main political scientist to receive much critical engagement is Alan Abramowitz (e.g., *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*, 2010), with whom Fiorina has enjoyed a long-running argument over whether the American public has truly polarized (Abramowitz's position) or merely sorted (Fiorina's). This is not to say that *Unstable Majorities* is unmoored from academic scholarship. While it presents little original research, the first nine chapters in particular provide a sure-footed tour of recent scholarship on American politics, and I suspect that professors and Ph.D. students alike will find the author's gloss on this literature edifying and provocative.

Although *Unstable Majorities* is at all points smart and reasonable, some of its claims are less compelling than others. I have no quarrel with Fiorina's well-known argument for sorting rather than polarization, but I think that he underplays the public's role in sustaining or even exacerbating elite polarization. As Gary Jacobson ("The Electoral Origins of Polarized Politics: Evidence From the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study," *American Behavioral Scientist* 56(12), 2010) argues, mass-level sorting has increased the ideological homogeneity of the primary electorates within each party, thus (through both electoral incentives and replacement) fostering extremism

among each party's nominees. (See also Devin Caughey, James Dunham, and Christopher Warshaw, "The Ideological Nationalization of Partisan Subconstituencies in the American States," *Public Choice* 176(1-2), 2018).

In its depiction of a moderate citizenry victimized by polarized elites, *Unstable Majorities* also neglects recent research showing that ordinary Americans are much more willing to endorse extreme issue positions than their representatives are (Douglas J. Ahler and David E. Broockman, "The Delegate Paradox: Why Polarized Politicians Can Represent Citizens Best," *Journal of Politics* 80(4), 2018). Finally, though the debate over the sources of Trump's support is far from settled, Fiorina's emphasis on economic class is hard to square with the evidence for the primacy of racial and especially immigration attitudes in explaining voters' shifts toward Trump (e.g., John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, "The 2016 U.S. Election: How Trump Lost and Won," *Journal of Democracy* 28(2), 2017).

These quibbles notwithstanding, my overall assessment of the book is extremely positive. Indeed, it has few peers as a brief but wide-ranging overview of contemporary American politics. As such, it is an invaluable contribution to our discipline's collective effort to make sense of the vexing and perplexing political landscape in which we find ourselves.

Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became our Identity.

By Lilliana Mason. University of Chicago Press, 2018. 192p. \$105.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.
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— Yphtach Lelkes, *University of Pennsylvania.*

American politics feels like it has become blood sport. Democrats and Republicans report hating each other, and Trump and his supporters have vocally called for the jailing (and perhaps worse) of their opponents. A number of studies have shown that partisans are increasingly prejudiced against their political opponents, which manifests as, for instance, avoidance and vitriolic rhetoric, or taking material losses in order to avoid helping the other side (for a review, see: Shanto Iyengar et al., "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science* (Forthcoming)). Evidence for increasing hostility (or affective polarization as some call it) has stacked up over the past years. However, we have had far less evidence that explains how we got here. In *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became our Identity*, Lilliana Mason has offered the clearest and most convincing explanation for the current state of affairs.

Drawing on a rich bevy of literature from political science, psychology, and sociology, Mason blames the rise of affective polarization on changes in "social sorting," i.e., the decline of cross-cutting identities. In the

mid-twentieth century, the Democratic and Republican parties were big tents that held a wide array of social groups. The New Deal-era Democratic party, for instance, consisted of Southern Democrats and African Americans, farmers and labor unions, working-class voters and urban liberals. Today, the parties are far more internally homogeneous. The Republican Party is largely white, rural, Christian, and conservative, while the Democratic party contains more non-Christians, non-whites, and urban liberals. This process increases the likelihood that people will think of their partisanship as a social identity.

Decades of psychological research has shown that dividing ourselves into different social groups, leads to in-group favoritism and, often, out-group hostility. Past work has understood this social sorting as a sign of polarization. For instance, we have long known that rural and evangelical voters are more likely to vote for Republicans. Mason, however, sees the process of social sorting as the cause of (affective) polarization. This insight not only helps us see how we got to the fairly unpleasant status quo of American politics, but may also help us see how we may change things.

After discussing her theoretical framework, Mason shows that the parties are more socially sorted than they have been in the past 50 or so years. She then demonstrates that partisans who are socially sorted are more likely to dislike the other side and report strong negative emotions towards them than partisans who are not, even among people who hold similar issue attitudes (hence the title of the book). The socially sorted partisan is also more likely to engage in politics.

Finally, Mason offers some potential solutions to the problem of affective polarization. Most of these come from the toolkit of social psychology, e.g., contact theory, affirmation, and priming a shared identity that cuts across partisanship. Some evidence in favor of the last suggestion already exists, but I'm skeptical that the effects are large enough and that any intervention would scale-up enough to make a substantive difference. If the sorting of identities caused the problem, then only the unsorting of identities can fix the problem.

Mason offers some hope that the Republican party may become less homogenous, or at least that a segment of the Republican party may break away due to norm violations by the current administration. Institutional reforms also offer a way forward. For instance, Lee Drutman suggests that proportional representation (which can be implemented at the state level) would reduce polarization ("This Voting Reform Solves 2 of America's Biggest Political Problems." *Vox*, 2018). Moving politics away from a winner-take-all system would surely reduce the likelihood that partisans see each other as members of warring factions. However, since major state-level electoral reforms and a social realignment of the political parties are both unlikely, things are likely to get worse before they get

better as the United States teeters towards becoming a majority-minority country, exacerbating any threat felt by white Americans.

While Mason offers convincing evidence that increased social sorting is associated with increased affective polarization, the book falls short of providing definitive causal evidence. Her primary tool for causal inference is to create groups of sorted and unsorted by matching on a number of observable variables. Obviously, it would be impossible (or at least very difficult) to randomly assign citizens into sorted and unsorted conditions but nagging questions will remain without something cleaner than the current setup. For instance, perhaps exposure to elite rhetoric causes people to become both more polarized and more sorted (thus making the relationship spurious). Michele F. Margolis provides some evidence that this may be the case—exposure to right-wing rhetoric pushes some Republicans to increase their religiosity ("How Politics Affects Religion: Partisanship, Socialization, and Religiosity in America" *The Journal of Politics* 80(1), 2018), which also makes someone more sorted according to Mason's measures, and other studies have shown that exposure to elite rhetoric also increases polarization.

In addition to stronger causal evidence, I would have liked to see more explanation or even tests of the mechanism linking identity-driven sorting to affective polarization. Why does the decline in social sorting lead to increased affective polarization? Is it because we are no longer in contact with people from the other side, which results in distorted stereotypes that shape our attitudes? Does it lead us into echo chambers where we only hear from vitriolic elites attacking the other side? Does social sorting automatically lead to affective polarization, as per the minimal group experiments?

Finally, Mason acknowledges that the media may have played a role in affective polarization, but she also sees the media as a conduit of social sorting. The impact of partisan sources may also interact with fully formed identities, thereby exacerbating affective polarization. Social identifiers are also more open to identity-consistent information: they are less likely to process information critically when information comes from their group, and more likely to dismiss or counterargue information from the other side. If a Republican leader tells them, for instance, that the other side is "crooked," they accept that information without much hesitation. Social sorting is likely only one variable in a chain of processes that explains affective polarization.

These unresolved questions indicate that more work is needed on social sorting and affective polarization. In this way, Mason's book is an intellectual achievement: it opens the door (as well as sets the agenda) for future research. Her work has certainly made me think about affective polarization and American politics differently. Mason's work is necessary reading for anyone wishing to understand the

processes that explain the status quo, and is already having a large and well-deserved impact on academic and public conversation.

Contraceptive Risk: The FDA, Depo-Provera, and the Politics of Experimental Medicine. By William Green. New

York: New York University Press, 2017. 336p. \$89.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper.

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— Anna Kirkland, *University of Michigan*

Depo-Provera, known to most of us as an injectable birth control method that lasts for three months, was first approved in 1960 for treating endometriosis and recurring pregnancy loss. It did not turn out to be effective for those conditions; however, researchers discovered that it could prevent pregnancy in the long term. Its effectiveness at preventing pregnancy comes with risks, such as weight gain, heavy or irregular menstrual bleeding, bone loss, loss of libido, depression, and increased breast cancer risk. The fact that the drug can be administered simply by injection every three months has made it attractive for use in women who are thought to be unable to take a daily pill, notably, institutionalized women, disabled women, teenagers, poor women, and women of color. Depo-Provera has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as a contraceptive since 1992, but it was administered for decades before approval as an off-label medication in family planning clinics, doctors' offices, research settings, and clinical trials, as well as being court ordered in probation or parole cases.

William Green's *Contraceptive Risk* tells the story of how many different actors and institutions managed the risks of Depo-Provera for both women (who used it for birth control, primarily) and men (sex offenders who were injected for its chemical castration effect at high doses). Green argues that all of the primary actors—the FDA, the pharmaceutical company Upjohn (the manufacturer, since acquired by Pfizer), doctors who prescribed it off-label, and judges who ordered it for sex offenders—failed to properly and ethically manage the risks of Depo-Provera, and that it should be withdrawn or at least regulated much more tightly.

Green tells the Depo-Provera story through primary source analysis and legal methods across federal drug law, state civil law, and state criminal law, explaining the way in which the drug first came to be used in the United States, its early and lax testing in an Atlanta public hospital setting from 1967 to 1978, political and interagency disputes over contraceptive approval in the 1970s and 1980s and its eventual 1992 approval, the very limited personal injury litigation efforts against it, and its heyday in the 1990s as a probation condition for sex offenders. His approach focuses on the formal law and major institutions, drawing on the publicly available documents that track disputes about Depo-Provera

(hearings, advisory committee meeting minutes, legal opinions and documents), but also contextualizing these data with interviews with a few major figures who are profiled and with references to women's health advocacy organizations that were active in opposing the drug and documenting problems that women experienced.

The first half of the book takes place mostly in meeting rooms and courtrooms in the 1970s and into the 1980s in the context of Depo-Provera's availability on the market for physician use by medical judgment but without FDA approval as a general contraceptive, covering expert disputes as well as one woman's ultimately unsuccessful personal injury lawsuit against Upjohn (spanning 1978–90). At the point of the 1992 FDA approval, Green pivots to discussing the litigation landscape since 2004, in which the question has been whether Depo-Provera is responsible for harmful bone loss in the women who use it. There has been one large confidential settlement but also a string of plaintiffs' losses because of the learned intermediary doctrine, which makes the treating physician the one who is responsible for interpreting the drug's warnings for the patient (rather than the manufacturer).

The final part of the book switches to men's use of Depo-Provera in the criminal justice system as part of a probation deal, describing how judges have ordered ongoing use of the drug to depress sexual urges in convicted sex offenders and arguing that these cases violate offenders' constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The periodization of this chapter is largely in the 1990s, which Green characterizes as a time of moral panic and punitiveness in response to sex crimes, though Depo-Provera's use to treat sexual deviance dates back to 1966 work by medical researchers and clinicians at Johns Hopkins. The book concludes with normative, constitutional, and policy arguments criticizing the professional conduct of the wide array of actors discussed, and suggests reforms.

The main contributions of *Contraceptive Risk* are to be found in its carefully detailed descriptions of how civil law, expert government advising and regulation, and physician decision making came together to create the situation in which Depo-Provera could be prescribed for decades under conditions of disagreement and insufficient evidence, but whose harms are very difficult to represent as legal wrongs to any particular women. Green has combined accounts of lawsuits with the regulatory story very well, and scholars interested in law and courts, administrative agencies, and health and drug law will find this book to be a thoroughgoing scholarly discussion of the drug and its path through our governing institutions. The book shifts somewhat abruptly into the study of the drug's use on men for control of sexual deviance, but this chapter is the only source I am aware of that covers the topic from a legal perspective that also weaves in the medical side of the story, for example, describing the clinic at Johns